High vulnerability to crisis
The results of the BTI 2020 in the context of COVID-19. BertelsmannStiftung Policy Brief 2020/01 by Hartmann, Hauke
  
 
Governance in international perspective 
 In most of the 137 developing and transformation countries examined by the BTI 
2020, COVID-19 will exacerbate the very weaknesses that have marked the negative 
balance of the last decade: a lack of rule of law, limited political rights, fiscal 
instability and rising social inequality. 
 
Currently, the coronavirus pandemic is gripping 
large parts of the world. It is neither foreseeable 
how fast and far COVID-19 will spread, nor how 
long the resultant economic and social crisis will 
last until a vaccine is developed. What is clear, 
however, is that it will severely strain and probably 
overburden the often poorly developed health 
care systems of many of the 137 developing and 
transition countries examined by the Bertelsmann 
Foundation's Transformation Index (BTI), and will 
have far-reaching economic and social conse-
quences. Some experts are already predicting 
that many countries will be set back many years 
in their development and that hundreds of millions 
of people are at risk of falling back into extreme 
poverty (Steiner 2020). This is an unprecedented 
stress test for the stability of political institutions 
and the governance capacity of the states af-
fected by the pandemic. 
The current handling of the crisis and its future re-
percussions suggest that the pandemic will exac-
erbate the very weaknesses that have marked the 
negative balance of the past decade identified by 
the BTI 2020 (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2020). In 
many countries, it will  
 contribute to increase the concentration of 
power in the executive branch and accelerate 
an erosion of the rule of law, in conjunction 
with grave restrictions on political rights such 
as freedoms of assembly and expression, 
 further increase the severe fiscal and mone-
tary instabilities in many countries due to mas-
sive investment needs to contain the crisis 
and revive the economy,  
 and have a particularly severe impact on the 
weakest members of society, thereby further 
increasing poverty and inequality.  
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It might also intensify the already existing tenden-
cies towards polarization, exclusion and national-
istic isolationism, even though more positive sce-
narios of increased domestic solidarity and inter-
national cooperation are not to be written off 
prematurely. In this context, it is precisely the 
wealthy European countries that should send a 
strong signal of international solidarity and assis-
tance. 
Concentration of power  
and erosion of democracy 
In times of crisis, there is a growing willingness to 
accept restrictions on fundamental rights and an 
extension of executive powers in order to avert an 
imminent danger. This is the logic of emergency 
provisions incorporated in the constitutions of 
many states. Almost all governments have now 
responded to the rapid spread of the corona pan-
demic with rigid contingency plans designed to co-
ordinate infection control measures, expand med-
ical treatment and material procurement, impose 
curfews and contact bans, stimulate the economy 
and avoid social hardship.  
Even if federally constituted democracies such as 
Germany and Switzerland generally have cer-
tainly demonstrated their partly decentralized ex-
ecutive capacity (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2019), in 
many countries, a strong centralized leadership is 
not only accepted or preferred for reasons of (sup-
posedly) more effective policy coordination. It is 
also desired by many citizens, because in uncer-
tain times the need for information, encourage-
ment and orientation by a determined and guiding 
executive grows. 
However, this crisis-driven approval of a strong 
executive branch is currently prevalent at the end 
of a decade, during the course of which the sepa-
ration of powers has already been undermined, in 
some cases massively, in 60 of the 128 states ex-
amined by the BTI since 2010 (Donner 2020). In 
numerous countries, increasingly authoritarian 
heads of state now have the opportunity to further 
expand their already overstretched powers.  
The Hungarian example illustrates this problem: 
On March 30, Parliament adopted a self-disem-
powering emergency law by a two-thirds majority 
of the ruling Fidesz party that allows Prime Minis-
ter Viktor Orbán to govern by decree to deal with 
the crisis, extend the state of emergency indefi-
nitely and suspend or deviate from existing legis-
lation. This is combined with draconian sanctions 
for spreading misleading information and ob-
structing the fight against the pandemic and pro-
vides the government with extensive opportunities 
to further restrict freedom of expression and si-
lence public criticism. The indefinite nature of a 
state of emergency and the complete disempow-
erment of parliament constitutes the not only fac-
tual but also formal undermining of the separation 
of powers. The government thus has, in the words 
of the Hungarian philosopher Gáspár Miklós 
Tamás, used "the epidemic as a pretext to intro-
duce an open, structural dictatorship " (Deutsche 
Welle 2020). 
Even though the Hungarian undermining of the 
separation of powers represents the most serious 
case of democracy erosion to date, several gov-
ernments are already moving in a similar direc-
tion, especially regarding restrictions on freedoms 
of expression and assembly. In addition to Hun-
gary, the BTI 2020 particularly identifies Serbia, 
the Philippines, Tanzania and Zambia as candi-
dates for slipping into authoritarianism. In these 
countries, the rule of law has already been under-
mined to a worrying extent in recent years, and if 
the concentration of executive power continues in 
the wake of the Corona crisis, their separation of 
powers is also in danger of falling below minimum 
democratic standards, as has already happened 
in Turkey. 
The Turkish example, in turn, clearly shows that a 
concentration of power in the executive branch 
does not necessarily contribute to improving gov-
ernance performance, but rather limits the ability 
of governments to learn from their own experience 
and external advice (Schwarz 2020). Long before 
the corona crisis, a system increasingly tailored to 
one single leader gradually robbed itself of critical 
discourse, alternative ideas and thus ultimately in-
novative potential and flexibility.  
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Such a limited policy learning ability became par-
ticularly noticeable in the sluggish recovery from 
the Turkish economic crisis in 2018, the inefficient 
use of available resources and the uncompromis-
ing stance taken in international relations. 
Such an experience is shared by many countries 
in which the quality of democracy has deteriorated 
considerably. Almost a quarter of all governments 
demonstrated less willingness and ability to en-
gage in policy learning in the last two years, espe-
cially in defective democracies and new autocra-
cies like Turkey. In times of a global epidemic, in 
which rapid adaptability, transparent evaluation 
and communication as well as informed coopera-
tion between many social actors is required, this 
reduction in the quality of governance will have an 
even more damaging effect. 
The Chinese reaction to the unfolding corona cri-
sis, in turn, demonstrates the deficiencies of lim-
ited accountability and transparency especially in 
autocracies. When the first indications of a new, 
highly contagious infection risk appeared in mid-
November 2019 in the Chinese province of Hubei, 
this information was suppressed, concerned doc-
tors intimidated and laboratories closed. Precious 
time to contain COVID-19 was wasted, until the 
Chinese leadership had to correct itself after two 
months and then reacted with draconian 
measures of cordoning off and curfew in the af-
fected province. 
Since then, the country has – should the pub-
lished data be correct – apparently achieved sig-
nificant successes in containing this infectious dis-
ease and has also demonstrated an impressive 
willingness to cooperate and help at the interna-
tional level, but the triumphalism of the Chinese 
leadership seems propagandistic and out of place 
in view of its early failures. When Chinese Foreign 
Minister Wang Yi explains in an interview with the 
Reuters news agency that "only in China and only 
under the leadership of President Xi can there be 
such effective measures to put this sudden and 
fast spreading epidemic under control" (Reuters 
2020), he is ignoring the achievements of Asian 
democracies like South Korea and Taiwan. Their 
governments have, under similarly good condi-
tions - including a meritocratically oriented civil 
service and helpful previous experience with the 
fight against the infectious disease SARS of 2003 
- achieved similarly good containment successes, 
largely in compliance with rule of law standards 
and with a functioning and transparent early warn-
ing system. In this respect, there is much to sug-
gest that China, after initial and system-related 
mistakes, has taken many subsequent steps in 
the right direction, not because of, but despite its 
authoritarian one-party rule.  
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However, the record of pandemic control to date 
is mixed as far as the regime issue is concerned, 
partly due to the erratic course taken by numerous 
democratically elected populist governments. At 
present, it looks more as if the competence and 
legitimacy of a government are the decisive fac-
tors, regardless of the political system (Kleinfeld 
2020). This at the very least implies that - contrary 
to what the protagonists of a heavy hand claim - 
autocratization in itself does not promise effi-
ciency gains. 
Moreover, the results of the BTI 2020 point to se-
rious legitimacy deficits in autocracies and de-
mocracies alike. Since autocratic governments 
cannot resort to input-oriented legitimacy argu-
ments, they have to justify their rule solely by 
means of their economic and social performance. 
However, in the BTI 2020 only four autocracies 
(three Gulf states plus Singapore) achieve an ad-
vanced level of economic development, together 
with 22 democracies. In addition, there are eight 
autocracies, including China, Russia and Turkey, 
which have only achieved a limited economic 
transformation, but have reached a total score of 
6.00 points or more and are thus still in the upper 
half of the BTI's economic transformation table - 
together with yet another 22 democracies. If the 
autocratic performance record of only a good fifth 
(12 out of 56) of all economically and socially 
passable or successful states is already sobering, 
it becomes utterly catastrophic at the lower end of 
the BTI economic ranking. The 25 states with a 
particularly weak economic transformation status 
are exclusively autocracies whose governments, 
as in Iran or Venezuela, have to cling to ideologi-
cal justifications, because their output-oriented le-
gitimacy arguments have long been exhausted. 
Conversely, however, the cushion of legitimacy 
has also become thin in democracies over the 
past ten years. In many democratically governed 
countries, the BTI 2020 also records political and 
economic competition that is increasingly dis-
torted by corruption, abuse of power and patron-
age-based structures, resulting in political disen-
franchisement and growing social inequality. The 
growing frustration of many citizens with these de-
velopments is expressed in declining approval rat-
ings for democracy, which have fallen by 0.79 
points on a scale of ten on a global average since 
the BTI 2010. Among the 57 countries classified 
as democracies by both the BTI 2010 and the BTI 
2020, approval ratings fell in 34 states - and rose 
in only two (Mauritius and Senegal). Although 
clear majorities in most societies are still in favor 
of a democratic system, there is a growing dissat-
isfaction with the way democracy works in their 
countries and an increasing distrust of institutions 
and politicians. 
Such a level of distrust, both in democracies and 
autocracies, weakens the social fabric. The lack 
of legitimacy of many governments will make an 
effective and trustful all-societal response to the 
spread of COVID-19 even more difficult. 
The looming economic and social disaster 
Most of the 137 countries assessed by the BTI 
2020 do not have sufficient financial resources 
available for crisis mitigation, public health invest-
ments and economic stimulus packages. Already 
the BTI 2020 global Economy Report (Hartmann 
2020), written before the outbreak of the corona 
crisis, warned of an impending debt crisis, and 
since then this scenario has become much more 
likely. By mid-April, over 100 governments had al-
ready applied to the International Monetary Fund 
for financial assistance (IMF 2020). 
The past decade has been characterized by a 
sharp decline in fiscal discipline. Many govern-
ments initially benefited from a surge in foreign ex-
change earnings, which for some time remained 
at a high level and were fed by rising commodity 
prices and other sources such as remittances 
from migrant workers, tourism revenues and in-
dustrial goods exports. As a result, their budgets 
became increasingly expansive. When world mar-
ket prices for energy, metals and agricultural prod-
ucts fell rapidly from the end of 2014 onwards and 
as global demand weakened, this resource-driven 
growth model became fragile. Without productivity 
gains, product diversification, the strengthening of 
domestic demand and a substantial integration of 
the informal sector into the formal sector, it rapidly 
reached its development limits.  
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Many national budgets are now threatened with 
bankruptcy in view of the necessary investments 
in the health care system and crisis management, 
as well as with sharply decreasing international 
demand and massive capital outflow. The fiscal 
stability indicator in the BTI 2020 shows one of the 
worst deteriorations in this decade, with an aver-
age global decline of 0.45 points on the BTI 10-
point scale. The share of countries such as China, 
South Korea and Taiwan with a robust fiscal sta-
bility of 8 to 10 points almost halved from 37 per-
cent in the BTI 2010 to 20 percent in the BTI 2020. 
Many countries are more heavily indebted than at 
any time since the 1980s. According to the World 
Bank, the share of government revenue spent on 
interest payments alone is particularly high in Leb-
anon (45.7 percent) and Sri Lanka (40.0 percent). 
However, the governments of Brazil and Egypt 
also spend a whole third of their government rev-
enues on interest payments and have lost signifi-
cantly (-3 and -2 points respectively) in terms of 
the fiscal stability assessed in the BTI over this 
decade. Still a quarter of the budget is spent on 
interest payments in Ghana (-2), India (-1), Ja-
maica (-1) and Zambia (-2). The low-income coun-
tries are particularly affected, almost half of which 
are experiencing acute servicing difficulties. This 
is partly because the share of non-concessional 
loans at higher interest rates developing countries 
received has risen from just under a quarter to 46 
percent in the last twelve years (GDI 2019).  
Massive over-indebtedness could result in a wave 
of state bankruptcies in the wake of the corona 
pandemic. The economic shockwave has already 
reached numerous countries before the antici-
pated high infection rates have even occurred 
there. In Argentina, the restructuring of govern-
ment debt, which rose sharply again under Presi-
dent Mauricio Macri, is threatening to fail, South 
Africa's government bonds have again been 
downgraded to junk status by rating agencies, 
Brazil's growth forecasts have already been quar-
tered, and after the currency crisis of 2018 Turkey 
lacks the fiscal policy leeway for more than the 
presumably inadequate economic stimulus pack-
age of 15 billion euros announced March 18. 
Poorer and fiscally unstable energy exporting 
countries such as Angola, Nigeria and Venezuela, 
which are suffering not only from their own policy 
failures but also from the fall in oil prices induced 
by Saudi Arabia and exacerbated by lower de-
mand. In many developing countries, the domes-
tic currency has proved to be weak against the 
dollar, making debt servicing for dollar-denomi-
nated loans extremely difficult. As a result, the 
banking system in these countries is on the verge 
of collapsing. 
The tragedy of this precarious fiscal policy 
situation is that in many countries there is 
accordingly a lack of resources to deal with the 
comprehensive social shock that will result from 
overburdened health systems, the severe 
contraction of the economy and the resulting 
massive socioeconomic deprivations. The 
"hammer and dance" strategy pursued by highly 
developed industrialized nations such as 
Germany, i.e. to let the infection rate (and the 
resulting immunization of part of the population) 
rise in a mix of restriction and relaxation, if 
possible only up to the stress limit of the health 
care system (Pueyo 2020), to take parallel 
stabilizing measures for companies at risk of 
bankruptcy and to prevent social hardship, is not 
a viable path for most of the developing and 
transition countries examined by the BTI for 
several reasons. 
First of all, as outlined, almost all governments in 
these countries lack the fiscal capacities to take 
stabilizing and social policy measures on a Euro-
pean scale. 
Secondly, the medical infrastructure in most coun-
tries is so poorly developed that their capacities 
will very quickly be overstretched even with a 
moderate infection rate. For example, even under 
normal conditions, South Africa's comparatively 
well-developed health care system, compared to 
other African countries, is already at the limit of its 
capacity with over seven million HIV-infected peo-
ple. 
Thirdly, given the lack of hygienic, socio-spatial 
and management capacities in most countries, 
the infection rate cannot be kept under control 
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once the epidemic has broken out. The Indian ex-
ample, where millions of migrant workers carry the 
virus from the overcrowded cities back to their vil-
lages, illustrates that in the face of the daily strug-
gle for survival, the call for "social distancing" will 
go unheard. 
Life at or below the poverty line is part of daily ex-
perience for most people in developing countries. 
In the BTI 2020, 76 of 137 countries have a very 
low level of socio-economic development, rated at 
4 points or less. Thus, in more than half of all 
countries examined by the BTI, poverty and ine-
quality are widespread and indicate firmly estab-
lished patterns of exclusion. 
Despite a general decline in extreme poverty 
rates, social inequality has increased over the 
past decade, even in the few countries whose 
governments pursue active welfare policies. In 
Botswana, for example, the wealth of resources 
has been and is being used for a long-term devel-
opment strategy, which has resulted, among other 
things, in almost halving the official poverty rate to 
16 percent within 20 years. Nevertheless, about 
another third of the population lives only just 
above this poverty rate and continues to be ex-
posed to high social vulnerability, so that the co-
efficient of income inequality in the Gini index, cur-
rently around 0.53, still points to extreme socio-
economic polarization. In Latin America, the re-
gion with the greatest social inequality overall, nu-
merous governments have succeeded during the 
resource boom in fostering the emergence of a 
"precarious middle class" (Thiery 2020), millions 
of which have already slipped back into poverty in 
recent years and which is threatening to dissolve 
almost completely in the wake of the 
economic corona shock. 
A major problem in this context is the 
small size of the formal sector in most 
countries. According to the Interna-
tional Labour Organization, more than 
60 percent of the global workforce is 
employed in the informal sector, and 
in Sub-Saharan Africa, the figure is as 
high as 85 percent (ILO 2018). Even 
though the informal sector represents 
a safety valve for the unemployed, it is 
significantly less productive, less well 
paid, less accessible in terms of wel-
fare policies and hardly protected by 
labor law at all. The social vulnerabil-
ity of the population working in the in-
formal sector is therefore particularly 
high and, as in the case of India with well over 80 
percent of informal workers, is threatened by the 
corona crisis to increase dramatically. In this re-
spect, the pandemic threatens to evolve into a 
global social crisis of unprecedented magnitude.  
Poor governance in times of crisis 
Against the background of the acute threat of ma-
jor political, economic and social disruption, it is 
particularly problematic that many governments in 
developing and transformation countries are inad-
equately equipped for these major challenges. 
The current Transformation Index of the Bertels-
mann Foundation paints a worrying picture and 
shows that the quality of governance in many 
countries has declined significantly over the past 
decade. These include populous and economi-
cally powerful countries such as Egypt, Brazil, In-
dia, Indonesia, Mexico, Nigeria and Turkey. Over-
all, governance performance has deteriorated sig-
nificantly since the BTI 2010 in 42 of the 128 coun-
tries continuously surveyed (with a drop of at least 
0.50 points on the BTI 10-point scale), affecting 
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more than three billion people - almost half of the 
total population of the BTI country sample. 
In view of the need for a crisis strategy supported 
by society as a whole and coordinated internation-
ally, it is particularly alarming that that the consen-
sus-oriented aspects of governance such as con-
flict management or the willingness to cooperate 
internationally are declining very sharply.  
Existing ethnic, religious or regional cleavages are 
often instrumentalized and deepened, so that the 
polarization of societies has increased worldwide 
over the past decade. Since 2010, the ability or 
willingness of governments to mediate and defuse 
conflicts has declined in 49 countries.  
With a minus of 4 points on the BTI 10-point scale, 
this was particularly true of six countries, including 
Brazil, India and Turkey. President Jair Bolso-
naro's right-wing populism seeks to reverse 
Brazil's emancipatory and socio-political progress 
in the interests of its clientele of evangelicals, so-
cial conservatives and business lobbyists and has 
deepened the political divisions in his country. The 
Hindu-nationalism of Prime Minister Narendra 
Modi undermines the pluralistic and secular foun-
dation of the multi-ethnic state and intensifies the 
conflicts with the Muslim minority with ethnocen-
tric measures such as the new citizenship law or 
the abolition of autonomy rights for Kashmir. The 
authoritarian Islamism of President Recep Tayyip 
Erdoğan is directed against the followers of the 
Gülen movement and the Kurdish minority, and 
with its uncompromising persecution of opposition 
critics, Turkey is considered an autocracy by the 
BTI 2020. All three heads of state have in com-
mon that through their exclusionary policies they 
have contributed substantially to reducing a unify-
ing, non-identity-based social capital in their coun-
tries and thus made it more difficult for society-at-
large to fight the corona crisis. 
At the international level, too, the consensus-
building aspects of governance have lost consid-
erable weight, especially in Central America, the 
Middle East and in East-Central and Southeast 
Europe. Regional political power struggles and il-
liberal alliances have significantly impaired coop-
eration with external supporters and in the bilat-
eral and multilateral framework. It is precisely the 
regional willingness to cooperate, which generally 
is rated quite highly, that has declined sharply in 
the BTI 2020. This points to the problematic per-
spective that in many places the response to the 
corona pandemic will be characterized by nation-
alistic self-interest and isolationism. 
However, it is not yet possible to foresee what ef-
fects the global health, economic and social crisis 
will have on the quality of governance in develop-
ing countries. Much more positive scenarios are 
also conceivable. There are already signs of a dis-
enchantment with authoritarian-populist govern-
ments, whose confrontational and divisive policies 
have had a negative impact on effective crisis 
management in Brazil, Indonesia and the Philip-
pines, for example.  
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 First, their polarizing "us versus them" rhetoric 
is currently much less appealing, as it under-
mines comprehensive societal efforts to man-
age crises and perpetuates an enemy image 
that for most citizens has long since been re-
placed by the main threat of the pandemic.  
 Secondly, the anti-elitist style of populist gov-
ernance usually includes a marked distrust of 
studies by the established scientific elite, 
whose research results are, however, in high 
demand in the fight against the pandemic.  
 Thirdly, the pronounced personalization of po-
litical power in populist regimes also insinu-
ates a much more direct responsibility of 
heads of government for negative develop-
ments, and therefore induces them first to ig-
nore the crisis symptoms, then to play them 
down and finally to counter them with an "op-
timistic bias" (Booth and Lassa 2020).  
This trivializing reaction pattern known from US 
President Donald Trump also characterized the 
initial reaction of heads of state in Brazil ("little 
flu"), Indonesia ("small disease") or the Philip-
pines ("hysterical response") (Booth and Lassa 
2020, Satrio 2020, Palatino 2020). Although their 
current approaches now differ fundamentally, 
governments in all three countries have wasted 
precious time and lost credibility in combating the 
spread of COVID-19. 
In addition, it is quite conceivable that a compre-
hensive crisis could lead to increased solidarity 
within society, strengthening civil society self-help 
and cooperation against the grave social conse-
quences of the pandemic. Among the few democ-
racy indicators that have developed positively in 
the BTI over the past ten years is the increased 
ability of civil society in many countries to self-or-
ganize and to cooperate. 
Finally, before the spread of the virus reaches its 
peak in most countries, there is currently still the 
possibility of mitigating the impact of the crisis 
somewhat through significantly increased interna-
tional cooperation. In recent weeks, the first prom-
ising steps have been taken to support developing 
countries, from temporary debt relief by the IMF 
and initiatives to strengthen the World Health Or-
ganization to aid packages worth billions. How-
ever, Federal Development Minister Gerd Müller 
rightly calls for a clear signal that "Europe is help-
ing" and stresses that, for example, the EUR 15 
billion of the EU aid package is merely a realloca-
tion of already budgeted funds and that a substan-
tial increase is needed, including through stabili-
zation loans and emergency aid (Müller 2020).  
In view of the threat of famines of "biblical propor-
tions" (UN News 2020), which the United Nations 
World Food Programme is fearing in the absence 
of stabilization and support, it will be essential that 
the repeatedly emphasized political will for inter-
national cooperation quickly results in action. 
Then this crisis could also be an opportunity for a 
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